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Introduction 
Violent non-state actors (VNSAs) pose a pressing challenge to human and national security 
across the geo-political landscape. In the midst of a global war against terrorism, collective violent 
action thrives as a strategy of groups ranging from the al Qaeda network to the Maoist rebels of 
Nepal to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The dark dynamics of 
globalization enable VNSAs to prosper in a turbulent international environment marked by 
deepening roots of violence, failures in governance, and burgeoning illicit trade in guns, drugs 
and humans. With few exceptions, VNSAs play a prominent, often destabilizing role in nearly 
every humanitarian and political crisis faced by the international community. Successfully 
countering them is complicated by a host of factors, including the adaptive character of the threat 
and the difficulty of developing and implementing a coherent strategy that engenders measurable 
victories. 
 
By applying systems analysis to this intensifying problem, we first proffer an actionable and 
universal analytical framework for diagnosing the non-state adversary. Building on previous 
research into the operational environment and VNSA properties, we now expose the internal 
workings of the organization in order to understand sources of strength and critical vulnerabilities. 
This sets up a counter-VNSA (C-VNSA) strategy that goes beyond coercion to the defeat of the 
enemy. At its core, our C-VNSA strategy defeats a VNSA by: 1) denying the negative entropy, or 
stores of energy, required to survive attack; and 2) disrupting congruence, or fit, among 
subsystems to achieve system failure. By also understanding the indicators of organizational 
change during its developmental life-cycle, preemptory defeat before the VNSA reaches maturity 
becomes feasible. Importantly, our approach allows for measuring campaign progress by 
assessing changes in VNSA effectiveness. Thus armed, prospects improve for inter- and intra-
governmental collaboration, on-target intelligence collection and analysis, and successful 
execution of a multi-faceted, effects-based strategy.  
Applied Systems Theory 
The inter-disciplinary application of open systems theory serves as our diagnostic model for 
VNSA threat analysis and strategy development. Modern organizational theory views all social 
organizations as open systems, continually exchanging information and energy with the 
environment. This approach has already been applied to an understanding of the environment 
from which VNSAs are most likely to emerge. Thomas and Kiser developed a framework that 
provides insight to the inputs, energy conversions and outputs that produce groups employing 
collective violence to achieve a broad range of traditional and post-heroic goals.[1] This 
framework captures divergent factors too often examined in isolation, drawing attention to the key 
relationships that amplify the cycle of violent collective action. Progress has also been made in 
assessing the VNSA as an open system. Thomas and Casebeer illuminate the characteristics of 
all systems: 1) importation of energy and information; 2) through-put (energy conversion); 3) 
export of products to the environment; 4) cyclic pattern of activities; 5) negative entropy, or 
reserves; and 6) feedback (learning).[2] Each has implications for VNSA performance and a C-
VNSA strategy. Of these, negative entropy is particularly important to long-term survival since it 
directs attention to the means by which the organization stores energy to survive crises induced 
by a turbulent environment and direct attack. Like organisms, VNSAs also pass through a series 
interrelated stages in form and function, transitioning between gestation, growth, maturity and 
death. Life-cycle transitions are not necessarily linear, as groups can go from maturity back to 
gestation or from growth to destruction. During its life-cycle, environmental dynamics vary in their 
impact on behaviors, internal functions shift in relevance to organizational performance, and 
decision-making results from varying affective and rational factors. 
Adversary Sub-Systems 
Systems analysis allows us to approach geographically, and even temporally disparate groups 
within a common framework. Each operates within a structured environment, exhibits common 
system characteristics and progresses through comparable life-cycle phases. The diagnosis is 
completed by examining the internal workings of four common subsystems: support, 
maintenance, cognition and conversions. The three levels of analysis (environment, system, 
subsystems) provide the scaffolding on which we build the distinctive signature of each group. A 
VNSA's signature is a function of its unique interactions, or patterns of behavior, within and 
across the levels of the analysis. Signatures enable our C-VNSA strategy to retain its global 
consistency using a menu of transportable instruments and effects while still being tailored to the 




Support Subsystem. Religious students in Islamic schools — madrasas — are identified and 
recruited for jihad, money is collected and laundered through a front charity, small arms are 
purchased on the black market, and communiqués are faxed to media outlets around the world. 
These are just a few of the routine activities that constitute the dynamics of the support 
subsystem. The support subsystem works at the boundary of the VNSA, exchanging energy, 
monitoring and managing relations with the environment.[3] Five types of environmental 
transactions are most critical to the VNSA: recruiting, resource acquisition, stakeholder 
associations, intelligence gathering and product delivery (violence, services, ideology, etc.). Of 
these, resource acquisition and stakeholder associations are the most critical to organizational 
start-up and crisis survival-they are forms of negative entropy. Reliable, and often excess critical 
and scare resources are needed for groups to survive sustained counter-insurgency, -terrorism 
and -narcotic operations. In all stakeholder associations, the ability of support to survive crises is 
a function of how the VNSA attends to the relationship over time.  
 
Maintenance Subsystem. A jihadist is groomed through a madrassah, a Maoist insurgent is 
executed for collaboration with the state, and an assassin is promoted for successfully killing a 
justice minister. These activities are among the primary functions of the maintenance subsystem. 
This subsystem's over-aching goal is to protect the VNSA organism and its organs (subsystems) 
from incongruence and positive entropy-survival! Maintenance activities seek to preserve 
equilibrium, primarily through the socialization of personnel and a system of sanctions and 
rewards to maintain role performance.[4] Where the support subsystem focuses on accessing 
critical requirements, maintenance dynamics center on the "equipment for getting the work done," 
and in the case of VNSAs, the "work consists of patterned human behavior and the 'equipment' 
consists of the human beings."[5] The primary functions of the maintenance subsystem are 
socialization and rewarding and sanctioning. Socialization builds the culture, or system of values 
and norms, while rewards and sanctions maintain role behaviors. The interplay of these functions 
often results in a trend to a more mechanistic, or bureaucratic organization structure due to 
increased formalization and a corresponding decrease in adaptability. On the other hand, the 
institutionalization of role behaviors reduces uncertainty and serves as a form of negative 
entropy. 
 
Cognition Subsystem. A spy gathers intelligence, key leaders meet to plan a series of urban 
bombings, a cell structure is implemented to ensure secrecy, and directions are issued for 
acquiring nuclear materials. These are sample activities of the cognition subsystem, whose 
primary functions are learning, strategy and control. Together, they comprise the decision-making 
style of the VNSA, which is responsible for "controlling, coordinating and directing" the other 
subsystems."[6] The dynamic of decision-making may be the most difficult to diagnose, but it is 
also the most important for a coercive C-VNSA strategy that requires the VNSA to retain cognitive 
capacity to question underlying values. Where defeat is the goal, undermining the cognition 
subsystem is certain to induce disorder and uncertainty, which are precursors to the goal of 
inducing total system failure. 
 
As an example of our analysis for all eleven functions, learning deserves additional emphasis. 
VNSAs are cybernetic systems; they have a feedback capability that enables correction and in 
most cases, self-awareness. VNSAs, like organisms, develop regulatory mechanisms early in 
development (gestation). The most basic form of learning, which dominates the gestation and 
early growth period, is known as single-loop learning, or simply as cognition. Single-loop learning 
involves learning from the consequences of previous behavior, resulting in changes in "strategies 
of action or assumptions underlying strategies in ways that leave the values of a theory of action 
unchanged."[7] Single-loop learning is sufficient when changes in strategies and tactics can 
satisfactorily correct errors in performance or improve effectiveness. It is not always sufficient, 
however, when the environment is highly dynamic, or when the organization must change the 
values and norms that girder culture. The ability to adapt, to not only correct behavior, but to 
determine what behavior is correct, is essential for surviving crises.[8] It is a form of negative 
entropy known as double-loop learning. The double-loop refers to two feedback interfaces that 
link the intelligence about performance or the environment to strategies as well as to the values 
served by those strategies.[9] The strongest VNSAs, like al Qaeda, learn to learn. Therefore, our 
C-VNSA strategy must seek to drive groups to single-loop learning if defeat is the goal. If 
coercion is the goal, strategy should seek to enhance double-loop learning so the cognitive 
subsystem can effect changes in underlying values and norms. 
 
Conversion Subsystem. Child soldiers learn to shoot an AK-47, health services are delivered to 
a community, a suicide bomber records a martyr's video, guerilla forces ambush a convoy, a 
politician is kidnapped, or aircraft are used as missiles to attack landmarks. These activities are 
carried out by conversion functions which include operations, training, production and others. This 
subsystem's primary function is task accomplishment, converting energy within the system and 
outputting a product to the environment. In the case of VNSAs, the product of most concern is 
collective violence; however, our C-VNSA is also be concerned with other products that reinforce 
the system of violence, such as training and illegal goods, or outputs that strengthen their 
position, such as social services. Conversion activities and associated facilities are often the main 
focus: destroying cocaine production facilities in the jungles of South American, raining cruise 
missiles on terrorist camps in Afghanistan, protecting facilities against guerrilla attacks in 
Baghdad, or fighting Islamic militants in the Pankisi Gorge of Georgia. Our C-VNSA also 
encourages disrupting training and operations and destroying facilities and operatives; however, 
the most effective strategy targets all subsystems, recognizing that conversions do not have to 
occur for the VNSA to survive. Conversions do contribute to survival by providing a surplus of 
trained members and products, and successful operations can produce internal and external 
support; however, the VNSA can survive an extended period of dormancy by this subsystem if 
the others remain active.  
Life-cycle Vulnerabilities 
In a mature VNSA, the subsystems and associated functions outlined here are each generally 
well-developed, inter-related and of relatively equal in importance to system functioning. When 
mapped against life-cycle phases of a specific VNSA; however, the extent of their development 
and their relative value will vary substantially, presenting a unique VNSA signature and 
opportunities for preventive policy. Specific subsystems tend to "lead," or be the most critical to 
survival and organizational efficiency during each life-cycle phase. In order for a group to form in 
the gestation phase, an identity entrepreneur and nucleus of founders must be linked to 
resources, stakeholders and potential recruits. Embedding the primitive VNSA in the environment 
through a network of critical relationships is the responsibility of the support subsystem. Until the 
support subsystem does its work, maintenance and conversion subsystems will lack the people 
and tools required for socialization, sanctioning, training, production and operations. Although the 
support subsystem is most critical during gestation, it is guided by a basic cognitive subsystem. 
Decision-making and control are not the result of an elaborated, participatory process at this 
point. Rather, the identity entrepreneur can easily set the agenda and control functions without 
the need of other subsystems due to his familiarity with all other group members.  
 
The growth phase is entered when all subsystems initiate activity. In early growth, the support 
subsystem continues to lead, but is increasingly interlaced with the development of specific 
maintenance and conversion functions. Maintenance functions are likely to dominate in VNSAs 
that stress a transcendental, or more value-based agenda, such as the Islamic Jihad in Palestine 
or the Kahane Chai in Israel. These groups and others place a greater premium on loyalty and 
commitment to the religious or ideological goals of the group. Conversion functions will dominate 
in VNSAs that pursue a more pragmatic agenda, such as the Chinese Triads or the warlords of 
Afghanistan, where the accumulation of wealth or consolidation of power requires the production 
of drugs or the training of guerrillas to hold territory and extract resources.  
 
The growth phase is characterized by high levels of uncertainty related to the idiosyncratic 
behaviors by group members, doubt about reliability of resources and stakeholders, and the 
evolving character of the organization. In an effort to increase stability and survivability, the 
growth phase will increasingly reflect efforts to differentiate and enforce roles and responsibilities. 
Therefore, the maintenance and cognitive subsystems will assert themselves during late growth 
by clarifying goals and structures. Differentiation generates pressure to integrate functions, which 
is carried out by the control function. Additionally, the VNSA leadership will recognize the 
importance of continued environmental scanning through intelligence collection activities as a 
means to reduce uncertainty and harmonize the fit of its subsystems to the opportunities and 
constraints of the environment. In the most adept VNSAs, learning will gain prominence — the 
earlier it does in the life-cycle, the more successful the VNSA is likely to be in a turbulent 
environment. Finally, sporadic violent acts can be expected during the growth stage; however, 
these are more likely for the purpose of establishing legitimacy, enhancing recruiting, collecting 
intelligence and testing tactics than they are for achieving over-arching VNSA goals. 
 
For the fully mature VNSAs of the world, all subsystems perform in concert; congruence is 
achieved, uncertainty is managed, and negative entropy is built. Based on this ideal system type, 
each function is fully articulated in terms of sustainable, adaptable patterns of activity, the culture 
is strong, the decision making process is based on double-loop learning, control is efficient, 
training has efficacy, and operations achieve goals. We are fortunate this ideal rarely exists. Yet, 
even growing VNSAs trapped in single-loop learning, or lacking sanctuary for training, or failing to 
attract new recruits, or running short of funds, are tough to defeat.  
Counter-VNSA Strategy 
Equipped with increased insight to the structure and function of VNSA afforded by an open 
systems analysis of how VNSAs mature, we can formulate a comprehensive, effects-based C-
VNSA strategy. Our strategy addresses VNSA vulnerabilities across their life-cycle, both in terms 
of system/environment interfaces and subsystem functions; in other words, some parts of our C-
VNSA strategy will focus on the environment/system interface, while other aspects of it will focus 
on the "internal physiology," or functions, of a prototypical VNSA and how we can disrupt that 
physiology to maximum effect (e.g., can we identify the "recruitment organ" in a VNSA, and if so, 
how do we best attack it and the inputs it needs to accomplish its function of inducting people into 
the organization?).  
 
The desired effects depend on whether our goal is coercion or defeat. For coercion, the measure 
of merit would be the actual change in behavior. For defeat, the measure of merit is the total 
failure of the VNSA system. In reality, behavioral changes will not be clear and defeat a distant 
and sometimes elusive goal. Nonetheless, we can measure progress in our C-VNSA campaign 
as a function of VNSA system characteristics and performance. At the system-level, we should be 
pursuing effects of increased uncertainty and disorder, which will contribute to organizational 
inefficiencies and force the organization away from its pre-determined roles — all essential to 
crippling a system. In terms of performance, systems theory helps as well by directing attention to 
an input metric of resource utilization, an output metric of goal attainment, and a conversion 
metric of process efficiency. Thus, we can think about input effects broadly as inefficient resource 
utilization, which can be further broken down into effects such as dysfunctional stakeholder 
associations, reduced recruitment, and resource disruption. Conversion effects relate to 
subsystem performance, such as poor decision-making, misperception, disrupted 
communications, or importantly to incongruence, a break down in role behaviors. Output effects, 
where assessment traditionally focuses, include failed operations, reduced quality products, and 
a general failure to achieve desired changes in policy or defeat of an enemy. 
 
Strategy formulation is guided by principles. In war, these are general principles that have 
withstood the test of time and serve as a guide for operational implementation. Traditionally, there 
are nine principles, ranging from mass to offensive to surprise. Some of these traditional 
principles will have analogues in our systems-tutored view of VNSAs, while others will not; the list 
of principles on offer is not necessarily intended to transcend the traditional principles of war, but 
rather works in concert with them to produce maximum disruption and ultimately, system 
failure:[10] 
 
1. Leverage indirect "diachronic" effects.  
Military strategy often focuses on direct (synchronic) effects: effects that manifest themselves 
simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously, when action is taken. Open systems, however, present 
opportunities for indirect interventions; these are interventions whose impact is often not felt until 
far later in the developmental cycle (hence the term "diachronic", meaning across time). The 
value of indirect effects is that, owing to the feedback loops present in the system, they can offer 
a significant ratio between the cost of the intervention and its impact upon the system. In chaotic 
systems, such as the weather, indirect interventions may have generally unpredictable 
consequences; in an open system, however, regularities in causal relations between subsystem 
functions means we can often predict what impact a diachronic intervention may have on the end-
state of the system.  
 
2. Seek "synergy minus one" interventions.  
Complex systems usually manifest synergy; they produce effects that one would not have 
otherwise expected from a mere additive summation of the parts of the complex system. Well-
constructed VNSAs are often able to leverage synergy to have impacts disproportionate to their 
size. Synergetic systems are troublesome to deal with; however, this synergetic strength is also 
an Achilles' heel: generally, the removal of even one component of the synergetic complex 
disables the complex entirely. The mere conjunction of Shoko Ashara (the leader of Aum 
Shinrikyo) and intelligent disaffected Japanese youth does not produce a nerve gas attack in the 
Tokyo subway system — the relevant chemical weapons technologies must also be available; all 
three components of the system must be in place. Disabling synergetic subsystems by removing 
or neutralizing just one of the causal factors is called a "synergy minus one strategy."[11] Those 
wishing to combat complex systems would do well to seek out the subsystems that leverage 
synergetic effects and focus on disabling just one of the causal factors contributing to the 
production of the synergy.  
 
3. Disrupt well-connected nodes. 
As discussed, subsystems are alternately critical for organizational effectiveness depending in 
part on the life-cycle; others will not. Generally, critical subsystems lie at the nexus of multiple 
inputs and outputs. Attacking these well-connected nodes can have a dramatic effect on group 
performance. Attacking a person's brain will be much more likely to paralyze them than by 
attacking their hand; indeed, even a semi-successful assault upon a human's frontal lobe will 
impact their functioning much more than an entirely successful assault on both their arms. The 
cognitive subsystem in a terrorist organization will almost certainly consist of multiple well-
connected nodes. 
 
4. Leverage feedback loops.  
Some subsystems will be recurrently connected to other subsystems; others will not. For a 
subsystem to be recurrently connected, its components must provide causal input into another 
subsystem, and that subsystem must, in turn, provide causal input back into the previous 
subsystem; for a homely example, consider time management — a failure to manage your time 
well makes it difficult to meet writing deadlines; this, in turn, makes it difficult to manage your time 
well as you will always be working in "crisis mode." Interventions that affect the status of these 
subsystems will have cascading effects on the system as a whole; small time management 
failures can quickly magnify. Overstressing the authority subsystem of a VNSA can have a similar 
effect. Put a terrorist organization in a difficult position by feeding noise into its intelligence and 
counter-intelligence functions; being in this difficult position, in turn, makes good intelligence all 
the more important, which (again, in turn) magnifies the impact that the noise will have on the 
system. Leveraging feedback loops also undermines system congruence, making it difficult for 
subsystems to interact.  
 
5. Create positive entropy. 
One way in which organizations attempt to isolate themselves from rapid environmental change 
and disorder is by accumulating negative entropy; a stock of order within the organization used to 
"ride out hard times" when the inputs the organization would normally use to continue functioning 
are unavailable. Critically, a knockout blow can only be delivered to an organization if its reserves 
of negative entropy are already disrupted. Analysis to determine whether these reserves are in 
the form of cash surpluses, redundant communications, rigid socialization, etc., must be 
conducted to determine which is most critical to group survival. Attacking stocks may not directly 
impact the short-term ability of the VNSA to export its product (terrorist bombers, active cells, 
etc.), but it will set up the necessary conditions needed for a VNSA to die when it is attacked 
directly. 
 
6. Disrupt environment/organism interfaces.  
Organizations need input to survive. Disrupting critical inputs, especially at developmentally 
important phases of the organization's life-cycle, can stunt the organizations growth or possibly 
even shift it into an entirely different developmental pathway. In much the same way that vitamin 
D deficiencies cause rickets in young children that in turn affect the overall development of their 
muscular-skeletal system, so can critical deficiencies create brittleness in a VNSA (for example, 
cognitively backwards terrorist organizations — perhaps those stuck in single-loop learning — will 
be less effective groups on the whole). While VNSA are made more robust by certain 
environments, they are also made weaker by certain environments. For example, a VNSA that 
can draw upon a well-educated population for recruits will better be able to engage in 
sophisticated planning for attacks, or will be more effective at coordinating a comprehensive 
financial effort. Shaping the environment by disrupting inputs (be they material or information-
oriented) or by increasing turbulence can have debilitating effects on system performance. 
 
7. Attend to life history analysis.[12]  
The fact that VNSA have an ontogeny (a developmental history) is important, as it opens the door 
for VNSA to adopt different "life history strategies" (either rationally or through the accidental 
combination of luck and appropriate environmental exigencies). In population ecology, life history 
traits affect basic reproductive and survival schedules of organisms (such as size at birth, number 
of offspring, longevity, stage-specific growth rate, etc.). There are tradeoffs among these 
components of life history (otherwise organisms would be produced large at birth and keep 
producing many large offspring in perpetuity). For example, producing large offspring most often 
means that fewer offspring can be produced. Attending to life-history enables understanding and 
impacting how and what the VNSA spawns, as some VNSA will adopt a life history strategy 
reproducing slowly and only when they can produce an offspring organization that is fairly large 
and self sufficient, while others will adopt a life history strategy that involves reproducing quickly 
into very small cells only a small number of which will survive. Understanding life history will help 
shape strategy, as organizations that reproduce using the latter approach can be most effectively 
combated by shaping the environment so as to preclude fission, while groups that pursue the 
former approach can be effectively confronted directly…think of the difference between 
preventing the spread of a disease and hunting bears.  
 
8. Increase uncertainty.  
If organizations are to adapt to their environment, especially in the mature phase of their life-
cycle, they must bring to bear some cognitive capacity. Environmental scanning as an activity of 
the learning function is a hallmark of the mature organization. In turbulent environments, the 
VNSA spends valuable time trying to make sense of and look for resources in its environment. If 
such resources are unpredictable, the organization will "forage" more and spend less time 
actually producing a product. We want terrorist organizations to spend more time worrying about 
where they will obtain the inputs they need to sustain their operations and less time actually 
producing output (suicide bombers, fielded forces, etc.).  
 
9. Implement across the system.  
The proximity of the threat often drives strategies toward an output focus: harden targets, capture 
or kill terrorists, disrupt operations. To confront outputs directly is to engage in a force-on-force 
confrontation with VNSA; this is effective in some circumstances but not in others, and can play 
into the hands of an enemy that is planning on leveraging force asymmetries in its favor. A more 
effective application of principles would be to implement a strategy that is balanced against 
inputs, conversions and outputs. Specific inputs strategies include, but are not limited to 
environmental shaping, financial interdiction, Diaspora disruption, counter-narratives, fostering 
stakeholder distrust and identity gerrymandering. Conversion strategies involve intervening into 
any of the four subsystems. Even if interventions into a particular subsystem are not successful, 
disruption can be achieved by boosting incongruity between successfully functioning subsystems. 
If the support subsystem cannot successfully feed into the production subsystem, this is 
functionally equivalent to entirely disabling the support subsystem itself. Authority related 
disruptions, for example, include targeting key VNSA leadership or decreasing the span of control 
such leaders have within the organization, manipulating intelligence units to drop an organization 
back to single-loop learning, and interdicting flows of information. Maintenance related 
disruptions, however, would involve sabotaging the ability of a VNSA to socialize its members, or 
interfering with the rewards and sanctions system (possibly by beating the VNSA at its own 
game: cultivate an alternate attractive identity replete with even greater rewards). Output 
strategies include traditional direct engagements with the guerrillas or terrorists, effective 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations to detect impending attacks, capture of 
drug shipments, or even more creatively, alternative social services. 
Conclusion 
Our work is not a panacea, but it should add multiple dimensions to a strategy that sometimes 
focuses too much on the product of the system and not enough on the system itself. To disrupt 
the importation of energy, shape the environment and attack the environment/organization 
boundary. To destroy through-put, have a process-oriented attack plan. To attack export, meet 
the product head-on before it has been fully deployed. To interfere with the cyclic pattern of 
activities, interfere with internal activities that are critical, well-connected, or consist of exponential 
feedback loops. Attack negative entropy by disrupting or destroying critical stores. Disrupt the 
feedback and coding process by engaging in counter-intelligence and influence operations 
designed to increase uncertainty and disrupt communication. Destroy homeostasis by attacking 
critical nodes and disrupting system congruity. While doing these things, keep in mind our newly 
formulated principles of war for countering VNSAs, as they should inform all actions whether 
directed at input, conversions, or output. Our inter-disciplinary application of open systems theory 
provides a powerful framework for diagnosing adversaries, shaping their development and 
structuring an effects-based strategy for coercion and conquering. It is a global approach to a 
global challenge. 
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